When Children Object: Amplifying an Older Child’s Objection to Termination of Parental Rights by Pattison, Brent
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 49
2016 
When Children Object: Amplifying an Older Child’s Objection to 
Termination of Parental Rights 
Brent Pattison 
Drake University Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Family Law Commons, Juvenile Law Commons, and the State and Local 
Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Brent Pattison, When Children Object: Amplifying an Older Child’s Objection to Termination of Parental 
Rights, 49 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 689 (2016). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol49/iss3/4 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
WHEN CHILDREN OBJECT: AMPLIFYING AN OLDER
CHILD’S OBJECTION TO TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS
Brent Pattison*
“I know who my family is. What’s the point of getting
another?”1
“I tried to go [to court] when my parents got their rights taken
away. They didn’t let me go. I think that’s not right. I think
you should be there. It’s your parents.”2
INTRODUCTION
Each year, thousands of children become wards of the state when
a court terminates the legal rights of their parents. Between 2010
and 2014, more than 307,000 children lost their legal relationships
to their parents in Termination of Parental Rights (TPR) proceed-
ings.3 A growing percentage of child welfare cases involve older
children.4 At the same time, too many young people lose their legal
relationships with their parents without a family waiting to adopt
them.5 The stakes are high for children in TPR cases; nonetheless,
many children—even older children—cannot meaningfully partici-
pate in proceedings. Moreover, TPR cases threaten parents’ and
children’s rights to familial association.6
* Brent Pattison is an Associate Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the
Middleton Children’s Rights Center at Drake University Law School.
1. DEBORAH GIBBS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS FOR OLDER FOSTER CHILDREN: EXPLORING PRACTICE AND POLICY ISSUES 6-12
(2004).
2. Id. at 6–19 (alteration in original).
3. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS RE-
PORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2013 ESTIMATES AS OF JULY 2014 NO. 21 at 1 (2014), https://www.acf.
hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport21.pdf.
4. See Erik S. Pitchal, Where Are All the Children? Increasing Youth Participation in Depen-
dency Proceedings, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 233, 243 (2008). Throughout this Article,
the term “older children” is used to refer to children ten and over. Although this is, to some
extent, arbitrary, it seems simpler than using multiple terms like adolescent, teen, child (or
even “tween”). It is also consistent with the ages implicated by the “child objection” provi-
sions discussed in the Article.
5. See infra Part II.B (discussing frequency of TPR for older children).
6. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981). While a parent’s rights in
this regard are without question, there is less clear guidance on the child’s reciprocal rights
with regard to familial association. See John Thomas Halloran, Families First: Reframing Parental
Rights as Familial Rights in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. &
689
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Nonetheless, courts have struggled with how to incorporate the
perspectives of older children in TPR cases. Children infrequently
attend court proceedings,7 and the court may receive competing
narratives regarding the child’s position. Children are not always
represented by lawyers in TPR proceedings, and when they do have
legal representation, it may only be by a guardian ad litem (GAL)
who presents her position on what is in the child’s best interests,
rather than advocating for what the child actually wants.8
This Article explores how courts should address an older child’s
objection to TPR and ensure meaningful consideration of the
child’s perspective. A small minority of states give courts the discre-
tion to decline to terminate parental rights when an older child
objects to termination. In states with such an exception, how should
courts handle older children’s perspectives? What is the proper
weight to give an objection? How should courts decide whether to
terminate parental rights when an older child objects? This Article
addresses these questions in three parts. First, the Article describes
the state statutes that create exceptions to TPR when an older child
objects and analyzes the case law relating to those exceptions. Sec-
ond, the Article outlines why consideration of a child’s objection
makes sense from legal and social work perspectives, especially in
light of our current understanding of child development and legal
decision-making in other contexts. Finally, the Article argues that
states should adopt a hybrid version of the objections to termina-
tion currently in place in Virginia and Iowa. It also considers
concerns of practical implementation.
I. A CHILD’S OBJECTION TO TPR
There is less uniformity than one might expect in the way states
handle TPR hearings.9 Generally, however, TPR hearings include
two separate proceedings: one in which children are removed from
parental custody and placed in the care of relatives or foster par-
ents, and another that provides the family with family reunification
services.10 In order to terminate the parents’ rights through the sec-
ond proceeding, the State must prove there are legal grounds for
POL’Y 51, 63–64 (2014). Nonetheless, “until the State proves parental unfitness, the child and
his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural rela-
tionship.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982).
7. See Pitchal, supra note 4, at 244.
8. See infra Part III.B (discussing child representation in TPR proceedings).
9. Although states are bound by federal guidelines for TPR, the grounds for TPR and
the way hearings are handled vary. See Halloran, supra note 6, at 56.
10. See Pitchal, supra note 4, at 237–38.
SPRING 2016] When Children Object 691
termination (e.g. the child has been out of the home for a lengthy
period of time, the problems that led to the removal have not been
addressed, and there are continued reasons it would be contrary to
the child’s welfare to return the child home).11 The State must also
prove that termination of the parents’ rights is in the child’s best
interests.12 Finally, the court may decline to terminate parental
rights if any discretionary exceptions apply. For example, when the
child is placed with a relative, termination would be detrimental to
the child in light of the closeness of the parent-child relationship.13
A. Exceptions for a Child’s Objection
One less common exception to TPR involves an older child’s ob-
jection. A handful of states have statutory exceptions for a child’s
objection, and the age at which the objection has legal meaning
varies. In Iowa, a court “need not terminate the relationship be-
tween the parent and child if the court finds . . . [t]he child is over
ten years of age and objects to the termination.”14 In California, the
court may decline to terminate if it “finds a compelling reason for
determining that termination would be detrimental to the child,”
including when “a child 12 years of age or older objects to termina-
tion of parental rights.”15 In Virginia, parental rights “shall not be
terminated if it is established that the child, if he is 14 years of age
or older or otherwise of an age of discretion as determined by the
court, objects to such termination.”16
Virginia courts have referred to this provision as a “veto right” for
older children.17 Virginia, however, also gives the court the discre-
tion to override the child’s veto if the child suffers from a disability
that reduces the child’s developmental age and that the child is not
otherwise of an age of discretion.18 The Virgin Islands allow for an
exception very similar in nature to Virginia’s, but applies the excep-
tion to children “age 15 or older.”19 Maine used to have a provision
preventing termination if a child was at least fourteen years old and
11. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 232.116 (2014).
12. See, e.g., id.
13. See, e.g., id. § 232.116(3).
14. Id. § 232.116(3)(b).
15. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(c)(1)(B)(ii) (West 2015).
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(G) (West 2015).
17. Akers v. Fauquier County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 44 Va. App. 247, 264 (Va. Ct. App.
2004).
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(G).
19. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §201-2550(f) (2015).
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objected, but the provision was amended to merely require consid-
eration of the child’s wishes “in a manner appropriate to the age of
the child” when deciding whether to terminate parental rights.20
There are two obvious rationales for this kind of exception.  First,
in nearly all states, children may object to adoption if they are a
certain age.21 If a child is going to object to an adoption, it may
make little sense to terminate his or her parents’ rights. Even some
states that do not have specific statutory exceptions for the child’s
objection have developed case law disfavoring termination when a
child is likely to object to any adoption.22 A survey of judges who
hear TPR cases in different jurisdictions found that sixty percent
reported “requiring or desiring” a child’s consent to adoption prior
to TPR.23 Second, the provisions advance the goal of involving older
children in child welfare cases by giving the child’s position legal
meaning.24
Although it is more common for younger children to be the fo-
cus of TPR proceedings, older children still find themselves subjects
of proceedings.25 Almost ten percent of children in out-of-home
care after TPR in 2000 were between the ages of thirteen and seven-
teen.26 Twenty-two percent of children waiting to be adopted in
2012 were thirteen or over.27 In addition, state practices regarding
TPR of older children vary significantly.28 For example, in Texas,
almost one third of children in foster care who experienced TPR
20. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055(3) (2014).
21. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-203(2) (2015) (“Written consent to any proposed
adoption shall be obtained from the person to be adopted if such person is twelve years of
age or older.”).
22. See, e.g., In re Gena S., 101 A.D.3d 1593, 1595 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
23. See RAQUEL ELLIS ET AL., CHILD TRENDS, PUB. NO. 2009-40, THE TIMING OF TERMINA-
TION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS: A BALANCING ACT FOR CHILDREN’S BEST INTERESTS (2009), http://
www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Child_Trends-2009_09_09_RB_LegalOr
phans.pdf. Even if the child wishes to be adopted, TPR may not be pursued if adoption is
unlikely under the circumstances. See GIBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at 6-5.
24. Even when there is no specific discretionary exception to TPR, some states require
the court to determine and consider the child’s perspective. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 4055(3). In Iowa, there is both a discretionary exception for the child’s objection to TPR,
as well as a provision allowing the court to consider “the reasonable preference of the child”
when determining the child’s integration into a foster family as part of the “best interests”
analysis. IOWA CODE § 232.116(2)(b)(2), 232.116(3) (2014).
25. In 2000, children in the eight- to nine-year-old age group had twice the rate of TPR
compared to those aged thirteen to seventeen in 2000. See GIBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at 3-6. In
North Carolina and Colorado, youth aged thirteen to seventeen comprised forty-nine per-
cent of the children between eight and thirteen in the states, but only twenty percent of the
TPRs. See id. at 4-1.
26. See id. at 37.
27. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 3, at 4.
28. See GIBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at ES-2.
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were between the ages of thirteen and seventeen.29 In other states,
the numbers were much lower. Notably, states with child objection
exceptions have a lower rate of TPR for older children.30
The Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997 may have
increased the pressure on states to consider TPR for older children.
ASFA accelerated the timelines for family reunification in response
to concerns that too many children were languishing in foster
care.31 ASFA also mandated that child welfare agencies file for TPR
when a child, regardless of age, has been in out-of-home care for
fifteen of the last twenty-two months.32 There are three exceptions
to this requirement: (1) if the child is living with a relative; (2) if
the state agency documents a compelling reason why filing for TPR
is not in the child’s best interests; and (3) if the state has failed to
provide the family with the services necessary for reunification.33
Interestingly, a handful of states have explicitly included the objec-
tion of an older child as a compelling reason not to file for
termination when it would otherwise be required.34
B. Courts’ Approach to a Child’s Objection to TPR
There is little case law on the exception for a child’s objection,
and much of the case law that exists relates to ways courts avoid
applying the objection. This Section will discuss the case law that
has developed around the exceptions in California, Virginia, and
Iowa.35
29. See id. at 3-21.
30. Id. at 3-21 to 3-22 (Iowa (7.5%), California (2.5%) and Virginia (1.9%) had low
percentages of older children who had experienced TPR, but there were other states that
were similarly low without the same statutory exception to TPR).
31. Rachel Venier, Parental Rights and the Best Interests of the Child: Implications of the Adop-
tions and Safe Families Act of 1997 on Domestic Violence Victims’ Rights, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 517, 519 (2000).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 675(4)(E) (2014).
33. See id. Some commentators have criticized these exceptions because they create “an
extremely large escape hatch” that undermines ASFA’s permanency goals. David Herring,
New Perspectives on Child Protection, the Adoption and Safe Families Act—Hope and its Subversion, 34
FAM. L.Q. 329, 343–44 (2000).
34. See, e.g., OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 340:75-6-40.9(d)(2)(b) (2015) (explaining that a state
may be excused from filing a TPR petition if the child is twelve years of age or older and
objects to termination). In New York, if a child is fourteen or older and will not consent to
adoption, the state considers it a compelling reason to not file TPR. N.Y. SOC. SERV.
§ 384(b)(1)(k)(1)(ii)(C) (McKinney 2013). See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-702(5)(a)(II)
(2015).
35. There do not appear to be any cases from the Virgin Islands relating to their objec-
tion exception. The exception is very similar to the Virginia exception, and so it would likely
be analyzed similarly.
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1. California’s Exception
In California, the court may decline to terminate parental rights
if it finds a compelling reason termination would be detrimental,
including when “a child 12 years of age or older objects to termina-
tion of parental rights.”36 The leading case relating to this provision
is In re Christopher L,37 in which a parent appealed a trial court’s
decision terminating her parental rights, arguing that the fifteen-
year-old child unequivocally objected to termination.38 The court of
appeals disagreed and affirmed the termination. The appellate
court reviewed the child’s preferences holistically, examining his
testimony and records of his statements in agency reports.39 The
court noted that even though the child testified that he would not
want to be adopted if it meant he could not see his mother, he had
previously expressed a preference to be adopted.40 The court ex-
plained that his statements “do not constitute unequivocal
objections. Rather, the statements appear to reveal an internal con-
flict between his hope to be adopted and . . . his hope to see [his
mother] again.”41 The court drew a formal distinction between
“preference” and “objection” and determined the statements were
of “preference.”42 Because it did not find an “unequivocal” objec-
tion, the court declined to rule on the question of whether an
unequivocal objection by a child over twelve prevented termination
as a matter of law.43
The appellate court’s ruling laid out guidelines for identifying
whether the court should exercise the child-objection exception.
The court noted that it has an obligation, independent of the child-
objection provision, to “consider the child’s wishes to the extent
they are ascertainable.”44 The court of appeals explained that trial
courts should “explore the child’s feelings” about their parents, fos-
ter parents, and prospective adoptive parents, and that evidence of
36. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(c)(3)(B)(ii) (West 2015).
37. 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
38. Id. at 61.
39. Id. at 63.
40. Id. After initially telling the Court he did not want to be adopted if he could not see
his mother again, he later explained he would be “happy” to be adopted by his aunt and
uncle, and that he was “okay” with living with them because they made him feel safe. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 64.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 63 (citing CAL. WELF. INST. CODE § 366.26(h); In re Leo M., 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 253
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993)).
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the child’s wishes does not have be in the form of direct testi-
mony.45 The evidence could also appear in agency reports. The
court also rejected the mother’s attempt to import the adoption
consent rules into the termination matter.46 The fact alone that a
child over twelve must consent to adoption was not enough to pre-
vent termination under the facts in this case.
2. Virginia’s Exception
There are only a handful of published cases in Virginia that cite
to its “veto” or “child preference” provision. The published cases
largely deal with situations where the child was under the age of
fourteen, but the parent argued they had reached the “age of dis-
cretion” and so the veto should apply. For example, in Deahl v.
Winchester Department of Social Services,47 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia reversed a TPR when the trial court did not find whether the
thirteen-year-old child was of the age of discretion, and whether he
objected to the termination.48 The trial judge had shielded the
child from the ultimate question of whether he objected to termi-
nation, but had allowed questions that addressed the issue
indirectly.49 The child’s testimony indicated that he missed and
loved his parents, and that he would like to return permanently to
their care.50 The record also indicated, however, that the child had
previously not wanted to return to his parents’ care, and that there
was evidence that the parents had threatened to abandon him if he
did not tell the county Department of Social Services that he
wanted to be returned to their care.51 The termination order indi-
cated that the child, in chambers, had requested termination and
that the GAL agreed.52 The state supreme court explained that it
appreciated the judge’s “commendable” efforts to protect the child
from a hard choice, but noted that the statute requires giving the
child a “meaningful opportunity to object” when the child is either
45. Id. (citing In re Amanda D., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)).
46. Id. at 62 n.3. The court explained that dependency proceedings are special proceed-
ings governed by their own rules and code.
47. 299 S.E.2d 863 (Va. 1983).
48. See id. at 869.
49. The judge explained to counsel for the parent: “I don’t think it is advisable for this
boy to force you to say to this boy, ‘Jack, do you want to be taken out of the custody of your
parents and put with the Welfare?’” Id. at 865. He further explained that was a “very damag-
ing thing to ask anyone” and “he may want that but he is not going to want to say it or he may
say it and then just live with a lifetime on that thing.” Id.
50. See id. at 866.
51. See id. at 864.
52. See id. at 865.
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fourteen or has attained the age of discretion.53 Given the uncer-
tainty regarding whether there was an objection, or whether the
child had reached the age of discretion, the Virginia Supreme
Court reversed and remanded.
In Tackett v. Arlington County Department of Human Services, the
parent argued that the court erred when it ruled that a twelve-year-
old child did not have the maturity necessary to exercise the termi-
nation veto.54 The court of appeals explained that the age of
discretion analysis should focus on “whether the child, regardless of
how old he or she may be, is mature enough to intelligently con-
sider the circumstances and ramifications of the termination
proceeding.”55 The trial court concluded that the child’s views were
a result of manipulation by the mother, and that the child had
made inconsistent statements about whether she wanted to live with
her mother or her foster parents.56 The court also discounted the
child’s testimony because it was made in front of her mother and
grandmother.57
It is not unusual for the court to sidestep the exception by point-
ing to an unclear record regarding the child’s position. In an
unpublished case involving a fourteen-year-old child, there was a
poorly executed colloquy between the judge and the child about
whether he objected and, ultimately, it was determined that he did
not object.58 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision
that the veto did not apply.
3. Iowa’s Exception
Iowa’s exception permits children as young as ten-years-old to ob-
ject—the youngest age of any of the exceptions related to a child’s
53. The Court noted that it “may not always be necessary that the bald question be
propounded to the child provided the record otherwise clearly indicates the child’s wishes.”
Id. at 869.
54. 746 S.E.2d 509, 519 (Va. Ct. App. 2013).
55. Id. (quoting Hawks v. Dinwiddie Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 487 S.E.2d 285, 289 (Va. Ct.
App. 1997)).
56. See id. at 519–20.
57. See id.
58. See Scott v. Roanoke City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 103 at *22 (Va.
Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2012). The appellate court noted that F.S. appeared confused and did not
understand what termination meant. See id. The court, and counsel for the parties, tried to
explain the issue multiple ways during the hearing, and ultimately the trial judge asked the
parties to leave the room because F.S. indicated he felt pressured. See id. at *22–23. When the
judge asked him if he objected, F.S. asked what that meant, and the judge explained “[t]hat
is saying if you do not object then if her rights are terminated you could be placed for adop-
tion.” Id. at *24. F.S. responded “Okay.” Id.
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objection. But Iowa also has the least developed case law regarding
the application of the exception. There is only one Iowa Supreme
Court decision related to the exception: In re K.M.59 In K.M., the
state supreme court affirmed the TPR, and discussed the child’s ob-
jection in the context of analyzing whether TPR was in the child’s
best interests.60 Without noting the child’s age, the court explained
that it heard conflicting testimony about whether K.M. wished to be
reunited with her parents.61 The court also explained that the child
had never been explicitly asked about her preference, and praised
the trial court’s opinion that the child should not “be required to
make a decision to choose between her biological parents and po-
tential adoptive parents.”62
The only published guidance from the Iowa Court of Appeals on
the question of how courts should weigh a child’s objection is that
the exception is discretionary, not mandatory.63 There are no cases
that reverse a trial court’s decision that the exception does not ap-
ply. But a few unpublished cases avoid applying the exception by
noting either that the child is low functioning or that there is lack
of a clear record regarding the child’s wishes.64 Other exceptions,
such as when the child is in the custody of relatives, or when termi-
nation would be detrimental to the child given the closeness of the
parent-child relationship, have received much more attention from
the appellate courts in Iowa.65
C. Common Themes When Applying the Exceptions
Although the three states’ exceptions employ different ap-
proaches, common themes arise in applying all of them. First,
courts commonly avoid applying the objection because the issue is
not raised clearly, or no one makes a clear record regarding the
59. 653 N.W.2d 602 (Iowa 2002).




63. See In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 916 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).
64. See, e.g., In re J.B., No. 2-191, 2012 Iowa App. Lexis 256 at *6 (Mar. 28, 2012) (no
clear record of objection); In re B.B., No. 1-250, 2011 Iowa App. Lexis 1134 at *8–9 (Apr. 27,
2011) (child lacks maturity to make decision).
65. A Lexis search for each of the exceptions (e.g., § 232.116(3)(b), § 232.116(3)(a),
etc.) on February 22, 2015 generated only thirty-five references to the child objection excep-
tion, but over 300 to each of the other above-referenced exceptions. Lexis Advance,
LEXISNEXIS, http://advance.lexis.com/.
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child’s objection.66 The question is not just whether the child ob-
jects, but whether that objection is “unequivocal.”67 The court will
consider statements in court, statements to other professionals, and
even evidence of the child’s conduct.68 Because the court will evalu-
ate so many sources of evidence regarding the child’s wishes, there
are many opportunities for conflicting accounts. This makes it
more difficult for a judge to find that an objection is ever “unequiv-
ocal.” In addition, courts will not apply the objection if they believe
the parent manipulated the child’s view.69 Finally, when the parent
is the party arguing for applicability of the objection on appeal, the
court may consider the parent’s basis for believing the child ob-
jected to be speculative.70
Whether the child actually objects to the termination of her par-
ents’ rights can difficult to determine if there have not been
significant efforts by the agency, counsel, or court to understand
the child’s wishes. Furthermore, there is substantial disagreement
about the appropriate way to make a record of the child’s objec-
tion. Some courts are unwilling to allow children to be asked their
preference directly.71 On the other hand, at least one reviewing
court has reversed a termination precisely because the issue was ad-
dressed too indirectly.72 The biggest challenge to implementing an
objection may be simply how to make a record of it.
Second, when the court cannot sidestep the issue, the child’s ma-
turity level is usually the critical question when the exception is
66. L.C. v. L.C., B227495, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2151, at *8 (Mar. 23, 2011)
(explaining that the record did not reflect that the child objected; rather, it indicated the
child was interested in adoption by his aunt and continuing to visit his parents); In re J.B.,
2012 Iowa App. Lexis 256 (no record of objection).
67. In re Christopher L., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 57, 63 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); In re K.M., 653
N.W.2d at 606 (noting some testimony that the child wanted to be reunited with her parents,
but other testimony that she was conflicted on the question). One gets the impression that
the “equivocal” nature of the objection is less a reflection of equivocation, and more a func-
tion of the child’s confusion about what TPR and adoption mean.
68. In re Christopher L, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 1335 (considering not only the child’s testi-
mony, but statements made to agency officials months before the hearing); Tackett v.
Arlington Co. Dep’t of Human Servs., 746 S.E.2d 509, 519–20 (Va. Ct. App. 2013) (consider-
ing the child’s out-of-court statements to her therapist about her foster family and biological
family); In re Leo M., 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 253, 259 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (considering the child’s
conduct to infer his feelings on termination and adoption).
69. Tackett, 746 S.E.2d at 519–20.
70. See, e.g., L.C., 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2151 at *19 (“Despite mother and fa-
ther’s arguments to the contrary, the record of Jr.’s testimony does not show any objection.”).
71. See Deahl v. Winchester Dep’t of Social Servs., 299 S.E.2d 863, 868–69 (Va. 1983)
(explaining the trial court’s unwillingness to address the question directly); In re K.M., 635
N.W.2d at 602 (praising the trial court for not addressing the question directly).
72. See Deahl, 299 S.E.2d at 868–69.
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discretionary.73 In Virginia, when the objecting child is under the
age of fourteen, courts investigate whether the child is mature
enough to have intelligent views on the subject of termination, and
consider the “capacity, information, intelligence, and judgment of
the child.”74 The child’s maturity level does not have to be “ex-
traordinary,” but the child must be able to “intelligently consider
the circumstances and ramifications of a termination proceed-
ing.”75 While there are no cases related to the “disability override”
provision in Virginia’s exception, one can imagine that a similar
“maturity” analysis would be applied in that context.
Ultimately, applying the objections in Iowa, Virginia, and Califor-
nia hinges on whether there is a clear record of the child’s
objection and, if so, whether the child is sufficiently mature for the
court to take the objection seriously. Both of these questions can be
very challenging for a court to answer, and the case law relating to
the objections does not give a great deal of guidance to trial courts
about how to answer them.
III. AMPLIFYING A CHILD’S VOICE: THE IMPORTANCE OF CHILD
OBJECTION EXCEPTIONS
Despite the challenges in defining and implementing a child ob-
jection exception in California, Virginia, and Iowa, more states
should join them in recognizing this objection. A child objection
provision appropriately empowers older children to protect their
legal relationships with their families, and encourages them to par-
ticipate in their cases. It is also consistent with our current
understanding of child development and legal decision-making by
older children in other contexts. Finally, child objection exceptions
are consistent with realistic permanency planning for older
children.
73. See, e.g., In re B.B., No. 1-250, 2011 Iowa App. Lexis 1134 at *8–9 (Apr. 27, 2011)
(rejecting objection due to lack of maturity).
74. Hawks v. Dinwiddie Dep’t of Social Servs., 487 S.E.2d 285, 288 (Va. Ct. App. 1997)
(citing Coffee v. Black, 82 Va. 567, 569–70 (1886)).
75. Id. at 289.
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A. Contextualizing Child Objection Exceptions within
Child Welfare Law
Although child objection exceptions are uncommon in the TPR
context, the law already involves older children in important deci-
sion-making related to the ultimate outcome in child welfare cases.
The most relevant example is that the child’s consent may be re-
quired for an adoption after TPR. An older child’s consent is
required for adoption in “nearly all” states.76 Allowing a child to
object to termination is a logical extension of this consent require-
ment, and helps prevent children from becoming legal orphans.77
If the child will object to adoption, it does not further the child’s
sense of permanency to allow TPR over his or her objection. At
least two states, Oklahoma and New York, allow agencies to decline
to file TPR petitions when an older child objects, even when the
state would normally be required to file a TPR petition due to the
length of time the child has been out of the home.78
In addition, federal law already requires that courts consider the
position of older children regarding permanency planning. Courts
must “consult[ ], in an age-appropriate manner, with the child re-
garding the proposed permanency or transition plan for the
child.”79 Even though the court is not required to accept the child’s
position, its obligation to consult gives legal weight to the child’s
objection and promotes investigation of the child’s hopes and fears
regarding permanency, and empowers him or her in the decision-
making process.
76. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CONSENT TO ADOPTION 3 (2013), https://www.
childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/consent.pdf. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 600.7(1)(d) (2014) (adoption
requires the consent “of the person to be adopted if that person is 14 years of age or older.”).
The consent must be made in the presence of the court.
77. See infra Part III.C (discussing the way child objection provisions promote realistic
permanency planning and the problems associated with legal orphan status). But see In re
Christopher L., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 57, 62 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that Court was
unwilling to import the consent-to-adoption requirement into TPR proceedings). The term
“legal orphan” appears to have been coined by Martin Guggenheim to describe a child whose
parents’ rights had been terminated, but who has not yet been adopted. TPR does not guar-
antee that a child will be adopted. See LaShanda Taylor, Resurrecting Parents of Legal Orphans,
17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 318, 325–26 (2010). Children can be left in limbo and subject to
post-termination changes in placement. See id. For every year that a child spends in foster
care post-TPR, the likelihood of adoption is reduced by eighty percent. See id. at 321 n.9
(citing Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental
Rights of Children in Foster Care—An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121 (1995)).
78. Oklahoma and New York consider the objection of an older child to be a compelling
reason not to file TPR when it would otherwise be required. See OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 340:75-
6-40.9(d)(2)(b) (2015); N.Y. SOC. SERV. § 384(b)(1)(k)(1)(ii)(C) (McKinney 2013).
79. 42 U.S.C. 675(5)(c)(ii) (2012).
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Finally, the objection exception also appropriately reframes the
TPR narrative from a parent’s rights to a family rights model.80 Al-
though there is some debate about the nature and extent of a
child’s associational rights with his family, there is no question that
when a parent’s rights are terminated, it is not only the parent who
loses something. The child loses his legal relationship with his par-
ents, extended family members, and potentially his siblings.81 By
giving legal meaning to the child’s objection, states recognize that
termination of parental rights is a matter of children’s rights as
well.
Critics of a child objection exception might argue that a child’s
perspective is already incorporated into TPR proceedings. Some
states have specific laws requiring the court to consider the child’s
perspective.82 The child’s perspective, especially for older youth,
might also be considered as part of the court’s mandate to deter-
mine whether TPR is in the child’s best interests, or under one of
the other discretionary exceptions like the closeness of the parent-
child relationship.83
Mere consideration of the child’s perspective, however, may not
mean as much to older children if their views are strong enough
that they want to raise an objection. The availability of a legal objec-
tion empowers the child by giving their position real legal meaning,
especially in a place like Virginia where it can be determinative.
The fact that one state, California, has both provisions highlights
the insufficiency of a “perspective provision.”84 Moreover, folding
the child’s perspective into the best-interests analysis might make
sense for very young children, but it marginalizes the perspective of
older children who may have stronger views and more at stake in a
TPR case.85
80. See Halloran, supra note 6.
81. See Taylor, supra note 77, at 327–28 (explaining that the child loses the right to
continued financial support and inheritance rights); Randi Mandelbaum, Delicate Balances:
Assessing the Needs and Rights of Siblings in Foster Care to Maintain their Relationships Post-Adoption,
41 N.M. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011).
82. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE R. § 49-6-5(a)(6)(C) (2015) (“[The court] shall give considera-
tion to the wishes of a child fourteen years of age or older or otherwise at an age of
discretion.”).
83. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 232.116(3)(c) (2014) (explaining that the court need not ter-
minate parental rights if there is “clear and convincing evidence that the termination would
be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child
relationship.”).
84. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(c)(1)(B)(ii) (West 2015) (child objection); Id.
§ 366.26(h) (consideration of the child’s wishes regarding TPR).
85. See infra Part III.C (discussing the lower likelihood of adoption of older children and
the problems associated with “legal orphan” status).
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Another critique of the child’s objection is that it puts children
“in the middle” of a tense, and potentially traumatic, child welfare
proceeding. Allowing an objection could result in parents or others
manipulating the child’s position, and could cause older children
to feel pressured to express loyalty to their parents.86 This could be
especially true if the objection provision is like Virginia’s, and the
court may not able to terminate over the child’s objection. This
concern led the Iowa Supreme Court in K.M. to praise the trial
court for refusing to allow the child to be directly asked about his
position.87
The main problem with this critique is that older children are
already “in the middle” in these cases. As one agency worker ex-
plained, “[j]udges and guardians ad litem think they are shielding
kids from harsh realities, but this is their reality.”88 Anyone who has
represented older children in TPR cases realizes that both parents
and agency officials will try to claim that they speak for the child.89
Agency officials are quick to inform the court that a child wants
termination and adoption, but the same officials will discount the
child’s perspective when the child does not favor termination.90 Par-
ents will assert that their children oppose termination, and argue
that when the child supports termination, it is due to misinforma-
tion and misunderstanding.91
These problems are not likely to be worsened merely because the
child has a right to object to TPR. Rather, allowing a formal objec-
tion may make it more likely that judges, social workers, and
attorneys will explore the child’s views about TPR and adoption and
help alleviate the child’s fears or misconceptions about TPR.92
86. This is exactly what was alleged in Deahl v. Winchester Department of Social Services, 299
S.E.2d 863, 865 (Va. 1983). Allegedly, the parents told the child they would leave and never
see him again if he did not tell the Department he wanted to come home. Id. at 864.
87. 635 N.W.2d 602, 606 (Iowa 2002).
88. See GIBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at 6-19.
89. See Catherine Ross, The Tyranny of Time: Vulnerable Children, Bad Mothers, and Statutory
Deadlines in Parental Termination Proceedings, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 176, 181 (2004).
90. See Martin Guggenheim, How Children’s Lawyers Serve State Interests, 6 NEV. L.J. 805,
823 (2006) (“When children want to go home, that wish is often received by adults the same
way editors treat a story about a dog biting a man—they aren’t going to run with it. On the
other hand, when children say they do not want to go home, adults frequently will invoke the
child’s preference as a crucial factor to take into account.”).
91. In Deahl, the parents challenged the trial court’s unwillingness to allow the child to
testify specifically about his position on termination. 299 S.E.2d at 868–89. The “indirect”
approach to questioning him led inevitably to confusion regarding his position. The Virginia
Supreme Court agreed. Id. at 869.
92. A 2009 survey of Judges who hear TPR cases found that exploring the older child’s
feelings about TPR was critical because often the child has fears and misconceptions about
TPR and adoption that can be resolved by courts, social workers, or lawyers. See ELLIS ET AL.,
supra note 23, at 10–11.
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Moreover, the fact that the child has the right to object does not
mean she must exercise it, or that she must take any other position
in the case. The objection simply gives strong, legal weight to the
child’s position in situations where the child truly opposes the
state’s attempt to sever his legal relationship with his family.
B. Encouraging Participation
Child objection exceptions also address another problem in
child welfare law: lack of meaningful participation by children in
their cases.93 The median age of children in foster care has risen to
almost eleven, but even older children infrequently attend hear-
ings.94 Child welfare cases are the only kind of case where the
“person at the center of the case is rarely present and, in most
states, has no established right to be present.”95 The Pew Commis-
sion on Children in Foster Care issued a report in 2004 indicating
grave concerns about the state of child welfare and recommending
that courts “enable children and parents to participate in a mean-
ingful way in their own court proceedings.”96 The UN Convention
on the Rights of the Child also encourages child participation in
any proceedings affecting the child.97 Importantly, the Conven-
tion’s discussion of participation focuses on the child’s voice being
heard, not just the child’s best interests.98 Very few states have provi-
sions requiring child participation in child welfare cases, but
perhaps it should not be surprising that of those that do, two states,
Iowa and California, also have child objection provisions.99
Young people complain that the TPR process is frequently sub-
ject to confusion and misunderstanding. In a youth focus group on
the topic, young people explained that they were not told about
93. Miriam Aroni Krinsky & Jennifer Rodriguez, Giving a Voice to the Voiceless: Enhancing
Youth Participation in Court Proceedings, 6 NEV. L.J. 1302 (2006). Krinsky and Rodriguez explain
that courts play a “life-changing role” in the lives of children, “[y]et the voices of far too many
foster children and former foster youth are ignored in this process.” Id. at 1302. One young
person in a focus group explained “I didn’t even know that my rights were terminated until
years after it had been done.” GIBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at 6-21.
94. See Pitchal, supra note 4, at 243.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 244.
97. See Jean Koh Peters, How Children Are Heard in Child Protective Proceedings in the United
States and Around the World in 2005: Survey Findings, Initial Observations, and Areas for Further
Study, 6 NEV. L.J. 966, 973 (2006). The Convention allows for the child’s direct participation,
or participation through a representative.
98. See id.
99. See IOWA CODE § 232.91(4)(2014); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 349 (2014).
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TPR until after it happened.100 Even more disturbingly, one young
person recalled learning of the TPR, explaining, “I saw my picture
on the [agency] computer to be adopted.”101 In order to object to
TPR, the child will have to be informed in an age appropriate way
of what is happening in the proceeding, what his rights are, and
what his objection would mean. Although children would not nec-
essarily have to testify about their positions, or even take a position
at all, they would have to be advised that their perspective matters
and be given the opportunity to present it to the court.
Finally, similar arguments to those being made against child ob-
jection exceptions have been made against children being present
in court, or participating in the proceeding in other ways.102 But
young people report that the opportunity to be more involved in
child welfare proceedings “is exactly what they need to enable them
to heal and move on—hearing difficult information in an appropri-
ate setting, with support available and the opportunity to express
their own views about their life’s course, enables them to come to
terms with and work through the abuse and neglect they have
suffered.”103
C. Promoting Realistic Permanency Planning
Child objection exceptions also promote realistic permanency
planning. From a social work point of view, the critical issue is not
only whether TPR should occur, but whether the young person has
a sense of family and permanency.104 If TPR does not advance those
goals because there is no family waiting to adopt the child, or the
child is not emotionally prepared for termination, then it may do
more harm than good.105 The child may simply become a legal or-
phan.106 Children who do not have an adoptive parent waiting in
the wings are “left in legal limbo and are likely to experience post-
100. GIBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at 6-20.
101. Id.
102. See Krinsky & Rodriguez, supra note 93, at 1307.
103. See id.
104. See NINA WILLIAMS-MBENGUE, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, MOVING
CHILDREN OUT OF FOSTER CARE: THE LEGISLATIVE ROLE IN FINDING PERMANENT HOMES FOR
CHILDREN 1 (2008).
105. “TPR may force an adolescent to separate from their family before they are develop-
mentally ready to do so.” GIBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at 6-18.
106. Adolescents are eight times more likely to be in long-term foster care, as opposed to
adoption, than elementary school-aged children. Id. at 1–5. See generally Taylor, supra note 77
(discussing the negative legal, financial, and social effects of having no legal parent).
SPRING 2016] When Children Object 705
termination changes in placement.”107 Children in these circum-
stances generally experience higher rates of homelessness,
involvement in the criminal justice system, and public assistance
utilization, as well as lower educational attainment.108
In addition, social workers are well aware that adolescents fre-
quently have contact with their parents post termination, and
understand that TPR may not change the older child’s perspective
on permanency.109 If older children are just going to reunify with
their biological parents when they turn eighteen and the court
loses jurisdiction, then it makes sense to proactively plan for this
rather than terminate parental rights.110
For all of these reasons, many judges, even in states with no child
objection provision, are hesitant to terminate parents’ rights when
it is unclear whether the termination will lead to meaningful per-
manency for the child.111 Social workers often share these
concerns.112 Problems with establishing permanency post TPR have
even caused states to create legal frameworks to restore a parent’s
rights.113 Child objection exceptions encourage the kind of plan-
ning necessary to avoid these permanency traps and encourage the
use of other legal permanency outcomes, such as guardianship114 or
another planned permanent living arrangement,115 which can pro-
tect adolescents without requiring unwanted termination of their
107. Taylor, supra note 77, at 325. One study indicated that for every year a child spends
in foster care without being adopted, their likelihood of adoption decreases by eighty per-
cent. See id. at 326.
108. See id. at 328–29.
109. See GIBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at 6-15. Although in many states there is no guarantee
of contact with the birth family after termination and adoption, other states have a legal
framework for such contact. Lucy McGough & Annette Peltier-Falahahwazi, Secrets and Lies: A
Model Statute for Cooperative Adoptions, 60 LA. L. REV. 13, 15 (1999). See also Annette Ruth
Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implications for Collaborative Adoptive Law and Prac-
tice, 75 B.U. L. R. 997, 1012 (1995) (discussing importance of post-adoption contact for older
children adopted from foster care).
110. GIBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at 6-15. “Older kids always find a way to see their birth
parents. It’s where they go when they turn 18.” Id. (quoting a child welfare worker).
111. In a recent study, sixty percent of judges reported desiring or requiring an older
child’s agreement before terminating parental rights. See Ellis et al., supra note 23, at 4. How-
ever, in some jurisdictions, age and adoption likelihood are not factors at all. See GIBBS ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 6-6.
112. See GIBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at 6-8.
113. See, e.g., Randi O’Donnell, A Second Chance for Children and Families: A Model Statute to
Reinstate Parental Rights after Termination, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 362 (2010); Taylor, supra note 77.
114. See Joshua Gupta-Kagan, The New Permanency, 19 U.C. DAVIS J. OF JUV. L. & POL’Y 1,
13–22 (2015) (discussing guardianship as an important, but underutilized, approach to es-
tablishing permanency for children without unnecessarily ending a child’s ties to parents and
siblings).
115. A new federal law, the Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act,
eliminates the use of “another planned permanent living arrangement” as an option for chil-
dren under 16. Pub. L. No. 113-83, § 475A, 128 Stat. 1919 (2014). States are just beginning to
706 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 49:3
parental rights.116 These exceptions also promote meaningful en-
gagement between the social worker and the child about TPR and
the child’s wishes. This could help address the child’s fears about
TPR and make children more willing to consider adoption as the
ultimate permanency goal.117
D. Considering Child Development and Decision-Making
in Other Contexts
Giving stronger legal meaning to an older child’s objection is
consistent with our current understanding of child development
and adolescent decision-making in other contexts. Developmental
Psychologist Jean Piaget posited that between ages eleven and fif-
teen, children are in a stage of development where they can
“hypothesize and draw deductions, understand theories, and com-
bine them to solve problems.”118 According to Piaget, by age fifteen,
a child has the capacity for mature thinking and approaches
problems more like an adult would.119 Other research indicates
there is little difference in the cognitive abilities of later adolescents
and adults.120 Another study found that by middle adolescence,
children can “reason about multiple alternatives and consequences
. . . and use information systematically.”121 Research also shows that
decision-making by fourteen-year-olds with regard to their medical
needs is quite similar to that of adults.122
implement this statute, but eliminating APPLA as an option for children in early to mid-
adolescence (ages ten to fifteen) could result in more TPR petitions for this age group.
116. See GIBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at 6-15; see also Josh Gupta-Kagan, Non-Exclusive Adop-
tion and Child Welfare, 66 ALA. L. REV. 715, 738–39 (2015) (discussing non-exclusive adoption
as a way to provide a sense of permanency to a child while maintaining relationships with
biological parents and siblings).
117. GIBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at 6-8.
118. Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge’s Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child’s Capacity to Choose, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1873, 1879 (1996).
119. Id.
120. See id. at 1881. For example, sixteen-year-olds and seventeen-years-olds scored simi-
larly to eighteen-year-olds to twenty-four-year olds in competency related assessments.
KIMBERLY LARSON & THOMAS GRISSO, DEVELOPING STATUTES FOR COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL
IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS: A GUIDE FOR LAWMAKERS 17 (Apr. 2, 2012), http://
modelsforchange.net/publications/330.
121. See Mlyniec, supra note 118, at 1882 (quoting Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport,
Developmental Trends in Adolescent Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 129, 147–48 (1992)).
122. See id. at 1881 (citing Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Chil-
dren and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1590–91 (1982)).
The study considered evidence of “choice, reasonable outcome, rational reasons, and under-
standing as measures of competency.” Id. The adolescents studied were aged fourteen to
seventeen.
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Of course, not all of the evidence supports the proposition that
older children are mature decision-makers. Critics of Piaget have
noted that his formulations are based on “average children” and do
not take into account the way others may influence decision-mak-
ing by children.123 In addition, Piaget’s focus on cognitive abilities
does not account for adolescent behavior, which is more suscepti-
ble to peer influence, riskier, and more focused on immediate
consequences than that of adults.124 Furthermore, recent research
regarding adolescent brain development confirms that the adoles-
cent brain is far from fully developed.125 This research has been
used to justify changes in how courts address juvenile competency
to stand trial126 and juvenile sentencing in adult court.127
But valid concerns about developmental immaturity, impulsive
behavior, and a juvenile’s criminal culpability should not be used to
prevent older children from having a legal right to object in the
context of a civil TPR hearing. Older children have the cognitive
ability, and often the maturity, to make reasoned decisions in this
context. Furthermore, even when an older child objects to TPR, the
court still has options to protect the child from adverse conse-
quences stemming from that decision. A court’s decision to not
terminate a parent’s rights does not mean the child will return to
the parent’s custody. The child may remain in the care of relatives
or foster parents. The child’s objection simply prevents the state
from severing her legal relationship with her parents.
Child objection exceptions are also consistent with important de-
cisions children are allowed to make in other contexts. Older
children, for example, are allowed to make numerous medical deci-
sions with significant consequences. When a minor seeks an
abortion, she may not need a parent’s consent or a court order.128
An adolescent may be required to consent to inpatient mental
123. See id. at 1881.
124. See id. at 1883.
125. See LARSON & GRISSO, supra note 120, at 13.
126. See id. at 27 (discussing the relevance of developmental immaturity to juvenile com-
petency and proposing that states consider an age-based presumption of incompetence).
127. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (explaining that a child’s
developmental immaturity is one reason that life without parole sentences may not be auto-
matically imposed on juveniles waived to adult court).
128. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1971); Jennifer Rosato, Foreword, 8 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 195, (2008). In twelve states, parental notification is required, but not
parental consent. See State Policies in Brief: Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions,
GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_
PIMA.pdf. In the other thirty-eight states that require parental consent, there are “bypass”
statutes that allow minors to obtain an abortion without parental consent if they are suffi-
ciently mature and demonstrate an understanding of the consequences. See id.
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health treatment, and may be able to refuse life-extending treat-
ment over a parent’s objection.129 Minors may also obtain
contraception without a parent’s consent.130 While legal standards
governing adolescent autonomy in this area are admittedly varied
and fraught with contradiction,131 there is no doubt that the law
provides some autonomy to older adolescents to control their medi-
cal fate.132
Adolescents have a measure of autonomy in this area because
these decisions are deeply personal and relate to fundamental con-
stitutional concerns such as privacy and bodily autonomy.133 TPR
cases also implicate deeply personal decisions and constitutional
concerns: familial integrity and due process.134 And, in the TPR
context, judges may have more power to protect older children
from the consequences of their decisions than in the medical con-
text. As discussed above, sustaining a child’s objection to TPR does
not mean the child will return home. The child could remain in the
custody of relatives or foster parents, and the court can control any
contact the child has with her parents.
Older children are also allowed to make important legal deci-
sions in juvenile delinquency cases. Children are allowed to waive
their right to remain silent and their right to counsel in the context
of custodial interrogation.135 Once charged, they must decide
129. Amanda C. Pustilnik & Leslie Meltzer Henry, Adolescent Medical Decision Making and
the Law of the Horse, 15 J. OF HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2012).
130. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 681–82 (1977). Twenty-one states allow
minors to access contraceptives without parent consent. See State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Access
to Contraceptive Services, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.guttmacher.org/
statecenter/spibs/spib_MACS.pdf. Twenty-five other states allow it under certain circum-
stances, like when the minor has been pregnant previously, is of a minimum age, or faces
health risks without contraception. See id.
131. See Pustilnik & Henry, supra note 129 (noting that a child may be able to admit
herself into inpatient treatment for mental health issues, but be prohibited from getting an
aspirin at school without parent consent.). See also Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy:
Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1267 (2000) (explaining that a six-
teen-year-old may be able to decide treatment for an STD, but not for a complication related
to the STD).
132. At common law, some courts utilized the “mature minor rule,” which analyzed the
type of procedure at issue, the benefit of the procedure, and the child’s ability to compre-
hend the procedure and its implications. See Mlyniec, supra note 118, at 1893. Mlyniec notes
that courts gave little guidance as to who to determine a child was “mature.” See id.
133. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72–75 (1976). The Court ex-
plained that “[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when
one attains that state-defined age of majority.” Id. at 75.
134. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26–27 (1981).
135. There are special protections for children in this context, such as the consideration
of their age in determining whether the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. J.D.B.
v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2408 (2011). In J.D.B. the court noted that children “often
lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize choices that could be detrimen-
tal to them.” Id. at 2397 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979)).
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whether to waive their right to a trial and accept a plea agreement
offered by the state. In order for a plea to be accepted, the court
must find that the plea is knowing, intelligent and voluntary.136
Children are allowed to make these decisions in spite of the fact
that “juvenile proceedings can be more complex and perplexing
than many adult proceedings[.]”137 In addition, a guilty plea in a
juvenile case may have long lasting collateral consequences.138
While there are important protections in place to help children
make these decisions, and, hopefully, prevent exploitation of the
child’s immaturity,139 there is no question that delinquent children
have significantly more autonomy in decision-making than a simi-
larly-aged child in the child welfare system.140 There is also no
question that the state is more willing to see children as capable
decision makers when it serves the state’s interest, like when the
state obtains a plea of guilt from a child and avoids a delinquency
trial. Similarly, an attorney prosecuting a delinquency case is likely
to assert that a child has the maturity to knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily consent to custodial interrogation, but the same at-
torney prosecuting a TPR is unlikely to care much about whether a
child of the same age consents to TPR.
Traditionally, the child’s perspective has been given little atten-
tion in family law custody disputes. “The resolution of custody
disputes historically was made by reference to either a presumption
favoring one parent, or to a concept of fault.”141 This is changing,
however, as more states are requiring courts to consider the child’s
perspective when determining the “best interests” of the child.142
136. In Boykin v. Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court held that pleas must be knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary. 395 U.S. 238, 242–43 (1969). This rule has been applied to juve-
nile court pleas as well through case law and state statutes. See, e.g., In re E.F., 862 A.2d 239
(Vt. 2004).
137. Timonth Wynkoop, Neuropsychology of Juvenile Adjudicative Competence, 3 J. FORENSIC
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 45, 48 (2003).
138. See Michael Pinard, The Logistical and Ethical Difficulties of Informing Juveniles about the
Collateral Consequences of Adjudications, 6 NEV. L.J. 1111, 1113 (2006).
139. See, e.g., J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2406 (explaining that a child’s age is a factor to consider
in deciding whether there was a valid waiver of Miranda rights).
140. This is one reason courts and scholars have been pushing back against this idea in
light of new research on juvenile brain development. See e.g. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct.
2455, 2475 (2012) (holding that mandatory sentencing schemes requiring life-without-parole
sentences for juveniles violates the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); Kellie
Johnson, Juvenile Competency Statutes: A Model for State Legislation, 81 IND. L.J. 1067, 1094
(2006) (urging states to require courts to presume a child is incompetent if the child is under
the age of thirteen at the time competency is raised in a delinquency matter).
141. Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody
Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1534 (1994).
142. Mlyniec, supra note 118, at 1886. State statutes, however, often qualify this responsi-
bility and allow the child’s counsel to disregard the child’s wishes. See Brent Avery, Custody
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Lawyers are appointed for children in custody cases more fre-
quently as well.143 As in the TPR context, there is little guidance for
courts on how evaluate a child’s expressed preferences in child cus-
tody cases.144 Even if a court is not required to follow a child’s
wishes, judges appear to give much greater weight to a child’s posi-
tion when the child is fourteen or over.145
Although older children may have a limited voice in custody dis-
putes, there are important reasons to treat TPR hearings
differently. TPR cases are initiated by the state, and as a result have
constitutional implications, like due process and the right to famil-
ial association,146 that are not present in private family law disputes.
TPR cases also end the legal relationship between a child and her
parents. Custody decrees, on the other hand, presumptively result
in joint custody or some visitation with the noncustodial parent.147
They can also be modified later, unlike most TPR decisions.148
Ultimately, child objection exceptions make sense for a host of
reasons. They are consistent with other rights children have in the
child welfare context, and advance the goal of participation by
older children in their cases. They also promote realistic perma-
nency planning by ensuring that older children are either prepared
for TPR, or can object to becoming “legal orphans.” Finally, child
objection exceptions are also consistent with what is understood
about child development and decision-making in other contexts,
including medical decision-making and juvenile delinquency. In ad-
dition, courts have the power to protect a child from the
consequences of her objection. A child’s objection to TPR does not
mean she will return to a parent’s custody. There are other options,
such as legal guardianship with relatives or another caregiver,
which can preserve the family relationship while maintaining the
child’s safety.
and Visitation: Court Appointed Counsel and the Wrong Side of Soundproof Glass, 16 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 219, 222 (2007).
143. Although some states only appoint counsel in particular circumstances, like when
child abuse is alleged. See Avery, supra note 142, at 223.
144. See Mlyniec, supra 118, at 1887.
145. See id. at 1887–88. A study in Virginia found that judges focused primarily on age
when deciding how much weight to give a child’s wishes, noting that a child’s preferences
were dispositive or “extremely important” when the child was over the age of 14. Id.
146. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26–27 (1981).
147. See J. Herbie DiFonzo, From the Rule of One to Shared Parenting: Custody Presumptions in
Law and Policy, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 213, 215 (2014).
148. But see O’Donnell, supra note 113 and accompanying text; Taylor, supra note 77 (dis-
cussing statutes that allow reinstatement of parental rights post TPR).
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IV. IMPLEMENTING A CHILD OBJECTION EXCEPTION: SELECTING A
MODEL AND THE CRITICAL ROLE OF COUNSEL
States looking for a way to include an older child’s objection in
the TPR process should institute a combination of the approaches
discussed above. The best answer is to combine both approaches.
Combining the Iowa discretionary exception for children over the
age of ten with the Virginia veto provision for children fourteen
and over would allow courts to strongly consider the objection of
children between ten and thirteen, and prevent termination when
older children object.
A. Blending the Exceptions: Including Both a Veto
and Discretionary Objection
For children fourteen and over, a veto provision makes sense.
Nearly all states require a child’s consent for adoption, so giving the
child similar veto power over the termination helps avoid creating
legal orphans. As discussed supra, it is also consistent with what is
known about child development and the other kinds of legal and
medical decisions the law allows older adolescents to make. The
rationales for a veto provision for older children do not necessarily
extend to children with significant disabilities. In those cases, the
child’s consent is probably not necessary under most state adoption
statutes, and the child’s decision-making capacity is likely more
suspect.149
The ideal model also includes a discretionary exception for chil-
dren between the ages of ten and thirteen, and a similar approach
could be taken with children over the age of fourteen with disabili-
ties.150 The exception means that the child’s position, not just what
other parties and professionals think is best, has legal impor-
tance.151 Although the child’s objection may not change the
149. See Mlyniec, supra note 118, at 1882 (noting that nine-year olds are ill-equipped to
understand their rights in the legal process). But see Federle, supra note 141 (explaining that,
too often, children’s rights are improperly limited by adult determinations about the child’s
capacity).
150. While a child’s disabilities could impair their decision making and reflect develop-
mental immaturity, there is also the concern that minor disability issues could be
overemphasized by agency attorneys in order to undermine the child’s position. In addition,
children with disabilities are overrepresented in the child welfare system. See Rebekah
Gleason Hope, Foster Children and the IDEA: The Fox No Longer Guarding the Henhouse?, 69 LA. L.
REV. 349, 357–58 (2009).
151. This focus is consistent with developing views about the role of attorneys for chil-
dren in child welfare cases. Barbara Kaban et al., Report of the Working Group on the Best Interests
of the Child and the Role of the Attorney, 6 NEV. L.J. 682, 683 (2006). Ultimately, consensus is
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outcome of the TPR hearing, giving it legal meaning may positively
influence the child’s experience of the process.152 It may also force
state agencies to consider whether they ought to file a TPR petition
in the first place when a child objects.153 Finally, making the objec-
tion discretionary for children over the age of ten comports with
the variability of children’s decision-making abilities between the
ages of ten and thirteen.154
B. The Critical Role of Counsel.
Judges, social workers, and therapists play an important role in
ensuring children understand what TPR means and assessing the
child’s readiness for adoption.155 However, significant assistance
from the lawyer is required to help a child decide whether to for-
mally object to termination and to facilitate appropriate
participation in the case generally. The attorney must advise the
child in an age appropriate manner about the proceedings and her
rights within it.156 The attorney must help the child participate ap-
propriately in hearings, as well in the case in general. The attorney
has to help the older child understand the entire universe of op-
tions available to the child, and the legal meaning of those options.
Doing all of this in a developmentally appropriate way can be a
daunting task for a lawyer.157
moving appropriately toward ensuring that attorneys provide client-directed representation
to children. See id.
152. Krinsky & Rodriguez, supra note 93 (“[I]t is often the process and integrity of the
path followed, and not the ultimate result, that determine our perception of the legal sys-
tem.”). “Children who can express their views through counsel may take solace in the
rationality of the system that determines their fate—even if the decision is not one they
sought.” Catherine Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing Counsel for Children in Civil Liti-
gation, 64 FORDHAM L.J. 1571, 1619 (1996).
153. See supra note 34, 78 and accompanying text (explaining that a small number of
states allow agency officials to consider the child’s objection a compelling reason to not file a
TPR petition when the child has been out of the home for more than fifteen out of twenty-
two months).
154. See Mlyniec, supra note 118, at 1882 (noting that a child’s ability to focus selectively
on relevant information and “systematically compare information about alternatives im-
proves between the ages of 10 and 13.”).
155. See Ellis et al., supra note 23, at 10 (explaining that it is generally the role of child
welfare agency staff “to educate children about adoption and assess their adoption
readiness.”).
156. See Kaban et al., supra note 151, at 684.
157. See Marty Beyer, Developmentally Sound Practice in Family and Juvenile Court, 6 NEV. L.J.
1215, 1215 (2006). Dr. Beyer notes that the lawyer may not have clinical or special education
training, but must understand the impact of trauma, disabilities, and immaturity in order to
effectively represent his client.
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If the child decides to object, the lawyer faces another large chal-
lenge: making a record of the objection. Agency lawyers may
muddy the waters by referencing the child’s prior, conflicting state-
ments.158 If the child has any disabilities, agency lawyers may argue
that the child’s objection should be given less weight, or that the
court should override the veto due to disability.159 The attorney
must also answer the critical question of how the child’s position
should be presented. Should it be in the form of a written objection
or pleading? Testimony? An in camera meeting with the judge? An
effective attorney should also consider whether a better strategy
might be to focus less on the child’s right to object, and more on
other factors that might convince the court not to terminate.160 De-
ciding which approach to take requires strategic thinking by the
lawyer and informed input from the child client.
The child objection exception also has implications for the de-
bate about the role of counsel for children in child welfare
proceedings. Representation relating to the objection necessarily
demands a client-directed approach. But whether children should
have a client-directed attorney or an advocate who makes recom-
mendations in the child’s best interests (or both) is a far from
settled question.161 Arguably, the national trend is toward client-di-
rected representation, especially for older children.162 Professor
Donald Duquette has recommended a “Two Distinct Lawyer Roles”
model, allowing for a best-interests lawyer until age seven, and a
client-directed lawyer after that.163 Even in states that appoint a
“best interests” GAL or a GAL-Attorney hybrid, there is usually a
framework for that attorney to ask for a separate GAL to be ap-
pointed for older children so that the original attorney can
158. In re Christopher L., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 57, 63 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that the
child’s objection was “equivocal,” and that he had made prior statements indicating he would
like to stay with his aunt and uncle.).
159. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(G) (2015).
160. See Martin Guggenheim, Matters of Ethics: Counseling Counsel for the Child Client, 97
MICH. L. REV. 1488, 1504 (1999). “Good lawyers will mask reliance on their client’s prefer-
ences when arguing before courts known not to give much weight to a child’s preferences.”
Id.
161. See id.; Donald Duquette, Child Representation in America: Progress Report from the Na-
tional Quality Improvement Center, 46 FAM. L.Q. 87, 94–99 (2012).
162. See Duquette, supra note 161, at 100; LaShanda Taylor, A Lawyer for Every Child: Client-
Directed Representation in Dependency Cases, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 605 (2009); ABA Standards of
Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases at B-4; NACC
Recommendations for Representation of Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases at 13–14.
163. See Donald Duquette, Two Distinct Roles/Bright Line Test, 6 NEV. L.J. 1240, 1246–48
(2006).
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advocate for the child’s wishes.164 If a child did not have a client-
directed lawyer who can advise the child about her options and
help her make a record regarding her objection to TPR if she ob-
jects, then allowing the objection would certainly be less
meaningful.165 It is not difficult to imagine the weakness of an ob-
jection that is reported to the court by a best-interests GAL, and
then actively undermined by the same GAL.166 The child objection
exception is an excellent example of why older children need cli-
ent-directed representation in TPR cases. It is also an important
answer to critics who argue that court-appointed counsel for chil-
dren in child welfare cases usually ally with the state.167
Although the role of a lawyer is critical, there are still significant
practical hurdles to effective representation for children in TPR
cases. First, not all children will have lawyers in TPR cases. The
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) requires
states to provide a guardian ad litem for children in child protec-
tion cases, but CAPTA does not specifically require that the GAL be
a lawyer.168 Under CAPTA, the GAL could be a lay advocate like a
Court Appointed Special Advocate.169 Academics and practitioners
have argued that children have a constitutional right to counsel in
child welfare cases, and a handful of courts have determined that
procedural due process requires such a right.170 Nonetheless, a mi-
nority of states still do not provide lawyers for children in TPR
164. See e.g. IOWA CODE § 232.89(4) (2015) (explaining that a separate guardian ad litem
may be appointed “if the same person cannot properly represent the legal interests of the
child as legal counsel and also represent the best interests of the child as guardian ad li-
tem.”). Unfortunately, even in states where the law provides a separate lawyer for the child,
this often does not happen either because of the prohibitive cost of appointing a lawyer and
a guardian ad litem for one child, or the guardian ad litem simply does not ask the court to
appoint a lawyer for the child. See JENNIFER L. RENNE, LEGAL ETHICS IN CHILD WELFARE CASES
80 (2004).
165. One of the most common practical problems with determining applicability of the
child objection exception is making a record of the child’s objection. See, e.g., In re Christo-
pher L., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
166. See, e.g., In re A.T., 744 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007) (reversing a TPR order
because the GAL noted the child’s disagreement with TPR, but litigated in support of TPR).
167. See Guggenheim, supra note 90. Professor Guggenheim explains that while lawyers
for allegedly delinquent youth generally understand that their role is to fight against un-
wanted intervention in the client’s life, attorneys in child welfare cases rarely oppose similar
intervention, even when their clients oppose it. See id. at 809. Given this problem, Professor
Guggenheim notes that it is not surprising that states have not only been willing to fund
programs for representation of children, but have created child representation programs
that are superior to the frameworks for parent representation. See id. at 818.
168. 42 U.S.C. 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii) (2012).
169. See id.
170. See Duquette, supra note 161, at 90–91.
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cases.171 Finally, as discussed above, even if the GAL is an attorney,
he may not advance or even take seriously the child’s position if he
does not believe it is in the child’s best interests.
Second, even when lawyers are provided for children, crushing
caseloads and poor training interfere with effective representation.
The American Bar Association and National Association of Counsel
for Children have proposed caseload standards for attorneys,172 but
those caseloads are routinely exceeded. It is not unheard of for at-
torneys representing children to have caseloads as high as 450
children.173 In addition, in spite of training requirements under
CAPTA, the state of training for child advocates is far from ade-
quate.174 Limitations on access to counsel, high caseloads, and poor
training undermine effective representation for children in child
welfare cases generally, and addressing these problems is critical to
effective implementation of a child objection exception.
CONCLUSION
States should allow an exception to TPR when older children ob-
ject. For the oldest children, aged fourteen and above, the
exception should be a “veto” in line with Virginia’s exception. For
younger children, as well as older children with significant develop-
mental delays, the exception should be discretionary. Iowa’s
exception for children ages ten and over is a good model for the
discretionary exception. Allowing this graduated approach would
appropriately empower children to protect their legal relationships
with their parents and advance meaningful participation in their
cases. It is also consistent with our growing understanding of child
development and a child’s capacity for decision-making. There will
171. See A CHILD’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON LEGAL REPRESENTA-
TION FOR ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN 10 (3d ed. 2012). First Star reports that thirty-
nine percentof jurisdictions in the United States do not require legal representation for chil-
dren in child welfare cases. See id.
172. NACC Recommendations for Representation of Children in Abuse and Neglect
Cases 7 (2001) (no more than 100 individual clients at a time); ABA Standards of Practice for
Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases 22 (1996) (caseloads must be
low enough to ensure compliance with the ABA standards).
173. Caseloads in Fulton County, Georgia were that high prior to a class action lawsuit
which successfully argued that there is a constitutional right to counsel for children in depen-
dency cases, and that the right to counsel included the right to effective counsel. See Kenny A.
v. Perdue, 356 F.Supp.2d 1353, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
174. See Duquette, supra note 161, at 89. The National Quality Improvement Center on
Representation of Children in the Child Welfare System is promising project that is gather-
ing data and developing a best practice model to help improve representation for children.
See id. at 87–88.
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be cases where the availability of the objection places a heavy bur-
den on the child. It also requires a well-trained lawyer with the
resources to address a challenging issue in developmentally appro-
priate ways. But an older child has too much at stake in a TPR
proceeding to not give legal meaning to a child’s objection.
